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Abstract
We deﬁne a set of process algebra operators, that we call controller operators, able to mimic the behavior
of security automata introduced by Schneider in [17] and by Ligatti and al. in [3]. Security automata are
mechanisms for enforcing security policies that specify acceptable executions of programs.
Here we give the semantics of four controllers that act by monitoring possible un-trusted component of a
system in order to enforce certain security policies. Moreover, exploiting satisﬁability results for temporal
logic, we show how to automatically build these controllers for a given security policy.
Keywords: partial model checking, safety properties, automated synthesis of controllers.
1 Overview
Recently, several papers tackled the formal deﬁnition of mechanisms for enforcing
security policies (e.g., see [2,3,6,10,11,17]). A security policy speciﬁes acceptable
executions of programs. Examples of security policies are information ﬂow, avail-
ability, access control and so on (see [17]).
The focus of this paper is the study of enforcement mechanisms introduced
by Schneider in [17] and security automata developed by Ligatti and al. in [3,6].
Security automata monitor execution steps of some system, herein called the target,
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and terminate the target’s execution if it is about to violate the security policy
being enforced.
Here we model these security automata by process algebra operators (see [12]),
acting as controller operators. We propose a logical approach to the problem of
monitoring systems in order to enjoy security policies. As matter of fact, we express
security policies by a temporal logic formula and we exploit a huge theory of process
algebra and temporal logic in order to synthesize controller operators.
In [17], Schneider deﬁned security automata as a triple (Q, q0, δ) where Q is a set
of states, q0 is the initial state and, being Act the set of security-relevant actions,
δ : Act × Q → 2Q is the transition function. A security automaton processes a
sequence of actions a1a2 . . . one by one. For each action, the current global state
Q′ is calculated, by initially starting from {q0}. As each ai is read, the security
automaton changes Q′ in
⋃
q∈Q′ δ(ai, q). If the automaton can make a transition
on a given action, i.e. Q′ is not empty, then the target is allowed to perform that
action. The state of the automaton changes according to transition rules. Otherwise
the target execution is terminated. A security property that can be enforced in this
way corresponds to a safety property (according to [17], a property is a safety one,
if whenever it does not hold in a trace then it does not hold in any extension of this
trace).
Starting from the work of Schneider described above, Ligatti and al. in [3,6] have
deﬁned four diﬀerent kinds of security automata which deal with ﬁnite sequences
of actions: the truncation automaton which can recognize bad sequences of ac-
tions and halts program execution before a security property is violated, but cannot
otherwise modify program behavior. The behavior of these automata is similar to
the behavior of security automata of Schneider. The suppression automaton
can suppress individual program actions without terminating the program outright
in addition to being able to halt program execution. The third automaton is the
insertion automaton. It is able to insert a sequence of actions into the program
actions stream as well as terminate the program. The last one is the edit auto-
maton. It combines the power of suppression and insertion automaton hence it
is able to truncate actions sequences and can insert or suppress security-relevant
actions at will.
In this paper we introduce four process algebra operators Y K X, where X is
the target, Y is the program controller, i.e. the process that controls the behavior
of the target, and K is the name of the corresponding automaton. These operators
are able to mimic the behavior of the security automata brieﬂy described above.
In order to express security policies we use μ-calculus formulae because many
properties of systems are naturally speciﬁed by means of ﬁxed points and it is very
expressive.
Exploiting a huge theory for security analysis based on process algebra and using
satisﬁability procedure for the μ-calculus, we show how to automatically synthesize
program controllers Y , depending on the kind of security automata one chooses.
Moreover for truncation automata we show a method to build the maximal model.
This work represents a signiﬁcant contribution to the previous works (see [3,6,7,17]),
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where the synthesis problem for the security automata was not addressed. In fact,
most of the related works deal with the veriﬁcation rather than with the synthesis
problem.
Moreover, other approaches deal with the problem of monitoring the component
X to enjoy a given property, by treating it as the whole system of interest. However,
often not all the system needs to be checked (or it is simply not convenient to check it
as a whole). Some components could be trusted and one would like to have a method
to constrain only the un-trusted ones (e.g. downloaded applets). Similarly, it could
not be possible to build a reference monitor for a whole distributed architecture,
while it could be possible to have it for some of its components.
In our approach we actually start from a property φ that a system S must enjoy
also when it is composed with a possibly untrusted component X. By using the
partial model checking technique, the property φ is projected on another one, say φ′,
depending only on S and φ, that only the component X must satisfy. This allows
one to monitor only the necessary/untrusted part of the system, here X. Thus we
can now force X to enjoy φ′ by using an appropriate controller Y KX. (Note that
as a special case we have the opportunity to treat X as a whole system as in other
approaches).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the necessary background
on process algebras and (Generalized) Structured Operational Semantics (GSOS),
logic and security automata. Section 3 describes some process algebra operators
(controllers) corresponding to security automata under investigation. Section 4
shows how to automatically build controller programs that enforce desired security
policies. Section 5 shows how to build the maximal model for truncation automata.
Section 6 shows a simple example and Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Background
2.1 Operational semantics and process algebras
We recall a formal method for giving operational semantics to terms of a given
language. This approach is called Generalized Structured Operational Semantics
(GSOS) (see [4]). It permits to reason compositionally about the behavior of pro-
grams (terms).
2.1.1 GSOS format
Let V be a set of variables, ranged over by x, y, . . . and let Act be a ﬁnite set of
actions, ranged over by a, b, c . . .. A signature Σ is a pair (F, ar) where:
• F is a set of function symbols, disjoints from V ,
• ar : F → N is a rank function which gives the arity of a function symbol; if f ∈ F
and ar(f) = 0 then f is called a constant symbol.
Given a signature, let W ⊆ V be a set of variables. It is possible to deﬁne the set
of Σ-terms over W as the least set such that every element in W is a term and if
f ∈ F , ar(f) = n and t1, . . . , tn are terms then f(t1, . . . , tn) is a term. It is also
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possible to deﬁne an assignment as a function γ from the set of variables to the set
of terms such that γ(f(t1, . . . , tn)) = f(γ(t1), . . . γ(tn)). Given a term t, let V ars(t)
be the set of variables in t. A term t is closed if V ars(t) = ∅.
Now we are able to describe the GSOS format. A GSOS rule r has the following
format:
{xi
aij
−→ yij}
1≤i≤k
1≤j≤mi
{xi 
bij
−→}1≤i≤k1≤j≤ni
f(x1, . . . , xk)
c
−→ g(x,y)
(1)
where all variables are distinct; x and y are the vectors of all xi and yij variables
respectively; mi, ni ≥ 0 and k is the arity of f . We say that f is the operator of
the rule (op(r) = f) and c is the action. A GSOS system G is given by a signature
and a ﬁnite set of GSOS rules. Given a signature Σ = (F, ar), an assignment ζ is
eﬀective for a term f(s1, . . . , sk) and a rule r if:
(i) ζ(xi) = si for 1 ≤ i ≤ k;
(ii) for all i, j with 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ mi, it holds that ζ(xi)
aij
−→ ζ(yij);
(iii) for all i, j with 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ ni, it holds that ζ(xi) 
bij
−→,
The formal semantics of terms is described by a labelled transition system (LTS, for
short). that is is a pair (E ,T ) where E is the set of terms and T is a ternary relation
T ⊆ (E × Act × E), known as a transition relation. The transition relation among
closed terms can be deﬁned in the following way: we have f(s1, . . . , sn)
c
−→ s iﬀ
there exists an eﬀective assignment ζ for a rule r with operator f and action c such
that s = ζ(g(x,y)). There exists a unique transition relation induced by a GSOS
system (see [4]) and this transition relation is ﬁnitely branching.
2.1.2 An example: CCS process algebra
CCS of Milner (see [13]) is a language for describing concurrent systems. Here, we
present a formulation of Milner’s CCS in the GSOS format.
The main operator is the parallel composition between processes, namely E‖F
because, as we explain better later, it permits to model the parallel composition
of processes. The notion of communication considered is a synchronous one, i.e.
both processes must agree on performing the communication at the same time. It is
modeled by a simultaneous performing of complementary actions that is represented
by a synchronization action (or internal action) τ .
Let L be a ﬁnite set of actions, L¯ = {a¯ | a ∈ L} be the set of complementary
actions where¯ is a bijection with a¯ = a, Act be L ∪ L¯ ∪ {τ}, where τ is a special
action that denotes an internal computation step (or communication) and Π be a set
of constant symbols that can be used to deﬁne processes with recursion. To give a
formulation of CCS dealing with GSOS, we deﬁne the signature ΣCCS = (FCCS , ar)
as follows.
FCCS = {0,+, ‖} ∪ {a.|a ∈ Act} ∪ {\L|L ⊆ L ∪ L¯} ∪ {[f ]|f : Act → Act} ∪Π.
The function ar is deﬁned as follows: ar(0) = 0 and for every π ∈ Π we have
ar(π) = 0, ‖ and + are binary operators and the other ones are unary operators.
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Preﬁxing:
a.x
a
−→ x
Choice: x
a
−→ x′
x + y
a
−→ x′
y
a
−→ y′
x + y
a
−→ y′
Parallel: x
a
−→ x′
x‖y
a
−→ x′‖y
y
a
−→ y′
x‖y
a
−→ x‖y′
x
l
−→ x′ y
l¯
−→ y′
x‖y
τ
−→ x′‖y′
Restriction: x
a
−→ x′
x\L
a
−→ x′\L
Relabeling: x
a
−→ x′
x[f ]
f(a)
−→ x′[f ]
Table 1
GSOS system for CCS.
The operational semantics of CCS closed terms is given by means of the GSOS
system in table 1 and it is described by an LTS. We denote by Der(E) the set of
derivatives of a (closed) term E, i.e. the set of process that can be reached through
the transition relation. Informally, a (closed) term a.E represents a process that
performs an action a and then behaves as E. The term E + F represents the non-
deterministic choice between the processes E and F . Choosing the action of one of
the two components, the other is dropped. The term E‖F represents the parallel
composition of the two processes E and F . It can perform an action if one of the
two processes can perform an action, and this does not prevent the capabilities of
the other process. The third rule of parallel composition is characteristic of this
calculus, it expresses that the communication between processes happens whenever
both can perform complementary actions. The resulting process is given by the
parallel composition of the successors of each component, respectively. The process
E\L behaves like E but the actions in L∪ L¯ are forbidden. To force a synchroniza-
tion on an action between parallel processes, we have to set restriction operator in
conjunction with parallel one. The process E[f ] behaves like the E but the actions
are renamed viaf .
2.1.3 Behavioral relation: Simulation
It is often necessary to compare processes that are expressed using diﬀerent terms in
order to understand if there exists some behavioral relation between two processes
and which one (see [13]).
We present the notion of observational relation as follows.
E
τ
⇒ E′ (or E ⇒ E′) if E
τ
→
∗
E′ (where
τ
→
∗
is the reﬂexive and transitive closure
of the
τ
→ relation); E
a
⇒ E′ if E
τ
⇒
a
→
τ
⇒ E′. 4
Now we are able to give the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2.1 Let (E ,T ) be an LTS of concurrent processes, and letR be a binary
relation over a set of process E . Then R is said to be a simulation (denoted by )
if, whenever (E,F ) ∈ R, if E
a
→ E′ then ∃F ′ ∈ E s.t. F
a
⇒ F ′ and (E′, F ′) ∈ R.
4 Note that it is a short notation for E
τ
⇒ Eτ
a
→ E′τ
τ
⇒ E′ where Eτ and E′τ denote intermediate states
(not relevant in our framework).
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T′ρ = S F
′
ρ = ∅ X
′
ρ = ρ(X) A1 ∧A2
′
ρ = A1
′
ρ ∩ A2
′
ρ
A1 ∨A2
′
ρ = A1
′
ρ ∪ A2
′
ρ 〈a〉A
′
ρ = {s | ∃s
′ : s
a
→ s′ and s′ ∈ A′ρ}
[a]A′ρ = {s | ∀s
′ : s
a
→ s′ implies s′ ∈ A′ρ}
We use unionsq to represent union of disjoint environments. Let ρ be the environment ( a
function from variables to values) and σ be in {μ, ν}, then σU.f(U) represents the
σ ﬁxpoint of the function f in one variable U .
ρ = [] X =σ AD
′ρ = D
′(ρunionsq[U ′/X]) unionsq [U
′/X]
where U ′ = σU.A′(ρunionsq[U/X]unionsqρ′(U)) and ρ
′(U) = D′(ρunionsq[U/X]).
It informally says that the solution to (X =σ A)D is the σ ﬁxpoint solution U
′ of
A where the solution to the rest of the lists of equations D is used as environment.
Table 2
Equational μ-calculus
2.2 Equational μ-calculus and partial model checking
Equational μ-calculus is a process logic well suited for speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation
of systems whose behavior is naturally described using state changes by means of
actions. It permits to express a lot of interesting properties like safety and liveness
properties, as well as allowing to express equivalence conditions over LTS. In order
to deﬁne recursively the properties of a given system, this calculus uses ﬁxpoint
equations. Let a be in Act and X be a variable ranging over a ﬁnite set of variables
V . As we have already said, equational μ-calculus is based on ﬁxpoint equations
that substitute recursion operators. X =μ A is a minimal ﬁxpoint equation, where
A is an assertion (i.e. a simple modal formula without recursion operator), and
X =ν A is a maximal ﬁxpoint equation. The syntax of the assertions (A) and of
the lists of equations (D) is given by the following grammar:
A ::= X | T | F | A1 ∧A2 | A1 ∨A2 | 〈a〉A | [a]A
D ::= X =ν AD | X =μ AD | 
where the symbol T means true and F means false; ∧ is the symbol of the standard
conjunction of formulae, i.e. A1∧A2 holds iﬀ both of the formulae A1 and A2 hold,
and ∨ is the disjunction of formulae, so A1∨A2 holds when at least one of A1 and A2
holds. Moreover 〈a〉A is the (possibility operator). It means that “exists a transition
labeled by a after that A holds”. On the other hand, [a]A is the (necessity operator)
and means “for all transitions labeled by a, A holds”. Roughly, the semantics D
of the list of equations D is the solution of the system of equations corresponding
to D . According to this notation, D(X) is the set of values of the variable X,
and E |= D ↓ X can be used as a short notation for E ∈ D(X). The formal
semantics is in Table 2. The following standard result of μ-calculus will be useful
in the reminder of the paper.
Theorem 2.2 ([18]) Given a formula φ it is possible to decide in exponential time
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X//[f ] = X 〈a〉A//[f ] =
∨
b:f(b)=a〈b〉(A//[f ])
[a]A//[f ] =
∧
b:f(b)=a[b](A//[f ]) A1 ∧A2//[f ] = (A1//[f ]) ∧ (A2//[f ])
A1 ∨A2//[f ] = (A1//[f ]) ∨ (A2//[f ]) T//[f ] = T F//[f ] = F
Table 3
Partial evaluation function for relabeling operator.
in the length of φ if there exists a model of φ and it is also possible to give an
example of such model.
Partial model checking (pmc) is a technique that was originally developed for
compositional analysis of concurrent systems (processes) (see [1]). In order to ex-
plain how partial model checking works, we give the intuitive idea underlying it
describing pmc w.r.t. the parallel operator as follows: proving that E‖F satisﬁes a
formula φ (E‖F |= φ) is equivalent to proving that F satisﬁes a modiﬁed speciﬁca-
tion φ//E (F |= φ//E), where //E is the partial model checking function w.r.t. the
parallel composition operator (see [1] for the formal deﬁnition). The formula φ is
speciﬁed by the use of the equational μ-calculus. A useful result on partial model
checking is the following.
Lemma 2.3 ([1]) Given a process E‖F and a formula φ we have: E‖F |= φ iﬀ
F |= φ//E.
The reduced formula φ//E depends only on the formula φ and on the process
E. No information is required on the process F which can represent a possible
enemy. Thus, given a certain system E, it is possible to ﬁnd the property that
the enemy must satisfy to successfully attack the system. It is worth noticing that
partial model checking function may be automatically derived from the semantics
rules used to deﬁne a language semantics. Thus, the proposed technique is very
ﬂexible.
A lemma similar to Lemma 2.3 holds for a great range of process algebra op-
erators modeled by GSOS (see [1,8]). The partial model checking functions for
relabeling operator is given in Table 3.
2.2.1 Characteristic formulae
A characteristic formula is an equational μ-calculus formula that completely char-
acterizes the behavior of a (state in an) LTS modulo a chosen notion of behavioral
relation. Following the reasoning used in [5,14], we characterize a process w.r.t.
simulation as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.4 Given a ﬁnite state process E, its characteristic formula (w.r.t.
simulation) DE ↓ XE is deﬁned by the following equations: for every E
′ ∈ Der(E),
XE′ =ν
∧
a∈Act([a](
∨
E′′:E′
a
⇒E′′
XE′′)).
The following proposition holds.
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Lemma 2.5 Let E be a ﬁnite-state process and let φE,	 be its characteristic formula
w.r.t. simulation, then F  E ⇔ F |= φE,	.
2.3 Enforcement mechanisms and Security automata
In this paper we choose to follow the approach given by Ligatti and al. in [3] to
describe the behavior of four diﬀerent kinds of security automata.
A security automaton at least consists of a (countable) set of states, say Q, a
set of actions Act and a transition (partial) function δ. Each kind of automata has
a slightly diﬀerent sort of transition function δ, and these diﬀerences account for
the variations in their expressive power. The exact speciﬁcation of δ is part of the
deﬁnition of each kind of automaton. We use σ to denote a sequence of actions, ·
for the empty sequence and τ 5 to represent an internal action.
The execution of each diﬀerent kind of security automata K is speciﬁed by
a labeled operational semantics. The basic single-step judgment has the form
(σ, q)
a
−→K (σ
′, q′) where σ′ and q′ denote, respectively, the action sequence and
the state after that the automaton takes a single step, and a denotes the action
produced by the automaton. The single-step judgment can be generalized to a
multi-step judgment (σ, q)
γ
=⇒K
6 (σ′, q′), where γ is a sequence of actions, as fol-
lows.
(σ, q)
.
=⇒K (σ, q)
(Reﬂex)
(σ, q)
a
−→K (σ
′′, q′′) (σ′′, q′′)
γ
=⇒K (σ
′, q′)
(σ, q)
a;γ
=⇒K (σ
′, q′)
(Trans)
The operational semantics for each security automaton is given below.
Truncation automaton. The operational semantics of truncation automata is:
if σ = a;σ′ and δ(a, q) = q′
(σ, q)
a
−→T (σ
′, q′) (T-Step)
otherwise
(σ, q)
τ
−→T (·, q) (T-Stop)
Suppression automaton. It is deﬁned as (Q, q0, δ, ω) where ω : Act×Q → {−,+}
indicates whether or not the action in question should be suppressed (-) or emitted
(+).
if σ = a;σ′ and δ(a, q) = q′ and ω(a, q) = +
(σ, q)
a
−→S (σ
′, q′) (S-StepA)
if σ = a;σ′ and δ(a, q) = q′ and ω(a, q) = −
(σ, q)
τ
−→S (σ
′, q′) (S-StepS)
5 In [3] internal actions are denoted by ·. According to the standard notation of process algebras, we use
τ to denote an internal action.
6 Consider a ﬁnite sequence of visible actions γ = a1, . . . , an. Here we use ⇒ to denote automata compu-
tations. Before we use the same notation for process algebra computations. The meaning of the symbol
will be clear from the context.
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otherwise
(σ, q)
τ
−→S (·, q) (S-Stop)
Insertion automaton. It is deﬁned as (Q, q0, δ, γ) where γ : Act ×Q → Act×Q
that speciﬁes the insertion of an action into the sequence of actions of the program.
It is necessary to note that in [3,6] the automaton inserts a ﬁnite sequence of
actions instead of only one action, i.e., using the function γ, it controls if a
wrong action is performed. If it holds, the automaton inserts a ﬁnite sequence of
actions, hence a ﬁnite number of intermediate states. Without loss of generality,
we consider that it performs only one action. In this way we openly consider all
intermediate states. Note that the domain of γ is disjoint from the domain of δ
in order to have a deterministic automata.
if σ = a;σ′ and δ(a, q) = q′
(σ, q)
a
−→I (σ
′, q′) (I-Step)
if σ = a;σ′ and γ(a, q) = (b, q′)
(σ, q)
b
−→I (σ, q
′) (I-Ins)
otherwise
(σ, q)
τ
−→I (·, q) (I-Stop)
Edit automaton. It is deﬁned as (Q, q0, δ, γ, ω) where γ : Act×Q → Act×Q that
speciﬁes the insertion of a ﬁnite sequence of actions into the program’s actions
sequence and ω : Act × Q → {−,+} indicates whether or not the action in
question should be suppressed (-) or emitted (+). Also here ω and δ have the
same domain while the domain of γ is disjoint from the domain of δ in order to
have a deterministic automata.
if σ = a;σ′ and δ(a, q) = q′ and ω(a, q) = +
(σ, q)
a
−→E (σ
′, q′) (E-StepA)
if σ = a;σ′ and δ(a, q) = q′ and ω(a, q) = −
(σ, q)
τ
−→E (σ
′, q′) (E-StepS)
if σ = a;σ′ and γ(a, q) = (b, q′)
(σ, q)
b
−→E (σ, q
′) (E-Ins)
otherwise
(σ, q)
τ
−→E (·, q) (E-Stop)
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3 Modeling security automata with process algebra
In this section we give the semantics of some process algebra operators, denoted by
Y K X where K ∈ {T, S, I,E}
7 , that act as controller operators. These permit to
control the behavior of the (possibly untrusted) component X, given the behavior
of the control program Y .
3.1 Our controller operators in process algebra
Here we deﬁne our controller operators by showing their behavior trought semantics
rules. We denote with E the program controller and with F the target. We work,
without loss of generality, under the additional assumption that E and F never
perform the internal action τ .
3.1.1 Truncation automata: T
E
a
→ E′ F
a
→ F ′
E T F
a
→ E′ T F ′
This operator models the truncation automaton that is similar to Schneider’s auto-
maton (when considering only deterministic automata, e.g., see [3,6]). Its semantics
rule states that if F performs the action a and the same action is performed by E
(so it is allowed in the current state of the automaton), then E T F performs the
action a, otherwise it halts.
Proposition 3.1 Let Eq =
∑
a∈Act\{τ}
⎧⎨
⎩
a.Eq
′
iﬀ δ(a, q) = q′
0 othw
be the control process and let F be the target. Each sequence of actions that is
an output of a truncation automaton (Q, q0, δ) is also derivable from E
q T F and
vice-versa.
3.1.2 Suppression automata: S
E
a
→ E′ F
a
→ F ′
E S F
a
→ E′ S F ′
E
−a
−→ E′ F
a
→ F ′
E S F
τ
→ E′ S F ′
where −a is a control action not in Act (so it does not admit a complementary
action). As for the truncation automaton, if F performs the same action performed
by E also E S F performs it. On the contrary, if F performs an action a that E
does not perform and E can perform the control action −a then E S F performs
the action τ that suppresses the action a, i.e., a becomes not visible from external
observation. Otherwise, E S F halts.
7 We choose these symbols to denote four operators that have the same behavior of truncation, suppression,
insertion and edit automata, respectively.
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Proposition 3.2 LetEq,ω =
∑
a∈Act\{τ}
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
a.Eq
′,ω iﬀ ω(a, q) = + and δ(a, q) = q′
−a.Eq
′,ω iﬀ ω(a, q) = − and δ(a, q) = q′
0 othw
be the control process and let F be the target. Each sequence of actions that is an
output of a suppression automaton (Q, q0, δ, ω) is also derivable from E
q,ω S F and
vice-versa.
3.1.3 Insertion automata: I
E
a
→ E′ F
a
→ F ′
E I F
a
→ E′ I F ′
E 
a
→ E′ E
+a.b
−→ E′ F
a
→ F ′
E I F
b
→ E′ I F
8
where +a is an action not in Act. If F performs an action a that also E can
perform, the whole system makes this action. If F performs an action a that E
does not perform and E detects it by performing a control action +a followed by
an actio b, then the whole system perform b. It is possible to note that in the
description of insertion automata in [3] the domains of γ and δ are disjoint. In
our case, this is guarantee by the premise of the second rule in which we have that
E 
a
−→ E′, E
+a.b
−→ E′. In fact for the insertion automata, if a pair (a, q) is not in the
domain of δ and it is in the domain of γ it means that the action a and the state q
are not compatible so in order to change state an action diﬀerent from a must be
performed. It is important to note that it is able to insert new actions but it is not
able to suppress any action performed by F .
Proposition 3.3 Let Eq,γ =
∑
a∈Act\{τ}
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
a.Eq
′,γ iﬀ δ(a, q)
+a.b.Eq
′,γ iﬀ γ(a, q) = (b, q′)
0 othw
be the control process and let F be the target. Each sequence of actions that is an
output of an insertion automaton (Q, q0, δ, γ) is also derivable from E
q,γ I F and
vice-versa.
3.1.4 Edit automata: E
In order to do insertion and suppression together we deﬁne the following controller
operator. Its rules are the union of the rules of the S and I .
E
a
→ E′ F
a
→ F ′
E E F
a
→ E′ E F ′
E
−a
−→ E′ F
a
→ F ′
E E F
τ
→ E′ E F ′
E 
a
→ E′ E
+a.b
→ E′ F
a
→ F ′
E E F
b
→ E′ E F
This operator combines the power of the previous two ones.
8 This means E
+a
−→ Ea
b
−→ E′. However we consider +a.b as a single action, i.e. the state Ea is hide and
we do not consider it in Der(E).
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Proposition 3.4 Let
Eq,γ,ω =
∑
a∈Act\{τ}
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
a.Eq
′,γ,ω iﬀ δ(a, q) = q′ and ω(a, q) = +
−a.Eq
′,γ,ω iﬀ δ(a, q) = q′ and ω(a, q) = −
+a.b.Eq
′,γ,ω iﬀ γ(a, q) = (b, q′)
0 otherwise
be the control process and let F be the target. Each sequence of actions that is an
output of an edit automaton (Q, q0, δ, γ, ω) is also derivable from E
q,γ,ω E F and
vice-versa.
It is important to note that we introduced the control action −a in the semantics
of S and +a in the semantics of I in order to ﬁnd operators that were as similar
as possible to suppression and insertion automata, respectively. Other deﬁnitions
could be possible, although some attempts we made failed on deﬁning a tractable
semantics.
4 Synthesis of controller programs
Exploiting our framework we can build a program controller Y which allows to
enforce a desired security property for any target system X. We present an extension
of [10]. Here we have four diﬀerent operators and in particular we have to deal with
control actions.
Let S be a system, and let X be one component that may be dynamically
changed (e.g., a downloaded mobile agent) that we consider a possibly untrusted
one. We would like that for any actual behavior of X, the system S‖X enjoys a
security property expressed by a logical formula φ, i.e., ∀X (S‖X) |= φ.
In order to protect the system we might simply check the correctness of each
process X before it is executed or, if this is not possible (or not desirable), we may
deﬁne a controller that, in any case, forces each process to behave correctly. Here,
we study here how to build a program controller in order to force the unknown
component to behave correctly. Thus, we want to ﬁnd a control program Y such
that:
∀X (S‖Y K X) |= φ (2)
By using the partial model checking approach proposed in [9], we can focus on
the properties of Y K X, i.e.:
∃Y ∀X (Y K X) |= φ
′ (3)
where φ′ = φ//S .
In order to manage the universal quantiﬁcation in (3), we prove the following
proposition.
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Proposition 4.1 For every K ∈ {T, S, I,E} Y K X  Y [fK] holds, where fK is
a relabeling function depending on K. In particular, fT is the identity function on
Act 9 and
fS(a) =
⎧⎨
⎩
τ if a = −a
a othw
fI(a) =
⎧⎨
⎩
τ if a = +a
a othw
fE(a) =
⎧⎨
⎩
τ if a ∈ {+a,−a}
a othw
Now we restrict ourselves to a subclass of equational μ-calculus formulae that
is denoted by Frμ. This class consists of equational μ-calculus formulae without
〈 〉. It is easy to prove that this set of formulae is closed under the partial model
checking function and the following result holds.
Proposition 4.2 Let E and F be two ﬁnite state processes and φ ∈ Frμ. If F  E
then E |= φ ⇒ F |= φ.
At this point in order to satisfy the formula (3) it is suﬃcient to have:
∃Y Y [fK] |= φ
′
To further reduce the previous formula, we can use the partial model checking
function for relabeling operator. Hence, for every K ∈ {T, S, I,E} we calculate
φ′′
K
= φ′//[f
K
]
. Thus we obtain:
∃Y Y |= φ′′K
10 (4)
In this way, we obtain a satisﬁability problem in μ-calculus that can be solved by
Theorem 2.2.
5 Synthesis of Maximal Model
In the previous section we have shown a method to synthesize a program controller
for each of controller operators deﬁned in section 3.1. As matter of fact, we ﬁnd
a deterministic process that does not perform τ actions and that is a model for a
given μ-calculus formula.
In this section we deﬁne the notion of maximal model w.r.t. the simulation
relation and show how it is possible to synthesize a maximal program controller Y
for the operator Y T X.
We deﬁne the notion of maximal model w.r.t. the relation of simulation as
follows.
A process E is a maximal model for a given formula φ iﬀ E |= φ and ∀E′ s.t.
E′ |= φ, E′  E (see [15,16]). Informally, the maximal program controller Y is the
process that restricts as little as possible the activity of the target X.
9 Here the set Act must be consider enriched by control actions.
10Even if the process Y performs some actions τ it is possible to obtain from Y another process Y ′ with
only visible actions that is a deterministic model of φ.
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In order to ﬁnd the maximal model we exploit the theory developed by Walukiewicz
in [19].
Usually the discovered model is a non-deterministic process. In order to ﬁnd a
deterministic model we consider a subset of formulae of Frμ without ∨. This set of
formulae is called the universal conjunctive μ-calculus formulae, ∀∧μC. It is easy
to prove that ∀∧μC is closed under the partial model checking function (see [5]).
Proposition 5.1 Given a formula φ ∈ ∀∧μC, a maximal deterministic model E of
this formula exists.
In order to generate the maximal model E, we ﬁnd a model for φ ∧ ψ where
ψ = X, X =ν
∧
α∈Act\{τ}([α]F∨(〈α〉X ∧ [α]X)). The formula ψ permits us to check
all the actions in Act. Exploiting the theory of Walukievicz, we ﬁnd a deterministic
model E for φ ∧ ψ that does not perform τ actions. It is obviously a model of φ.
The following lemma holds.
Lemma 5.2 Let E′ |= φ with φ ∈ ∀∧μC. Then the model of φ ∧ ψ E, is such that
E′  E.
Hence E is the maximal model for φ.
6 A simple example
consider the following equational deﬁnition φ = Z where Z =ν [τ ]Z ∧ [a]W and
W =ν [τ ]W ∧ [c]F. It asserts that after every action a, an action c cannot be
performed. Let Act = {a, b, c, τ, a¯, b¯, c¯} be the set of actions. Applying the partial
evaluation for the parallel operator we obtain, after some simpliﬁcations, the fol-
lowing system of equation, that we denoted with D.
Z//S =ν [τ ]Z//S ∧ [a¯]Z//S′ ∧ [a]W//S ∧W//S′ Z//0 = T
W//S′ =ν [τ ]W//S′ ∧ [b¯]W//0 ∧ [c]F W//0 = T
Z//S′ =ν [τ ]Z//S′ ∧ [b¯]Z//0 ∧ [a]W//S′
W//S =ν [τ ]W//S ∧ [a¯]W//S′ ∧ [c]F
where S
a
−→ S′ so S′ is b.0.
The information obtained through partial model checking can be used to enforce
a security policy. In particular, choosing one of the four operators and using its
deﬁnition we simply need to ﬁnd a process Y [fK], where K depend on the chosen
controller, that is a model for the previous formula.
In this simple example we choose the controller operator S . Hence we apply
the partial model checking for relabeling function fS to the previous formula, that
we have simpliﬁed replacing W//0 and Z//0 by T (and assumed that Y can only
suppress c actions). We obtain D//fS
as follows.
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Z//S,fS
=ν [τ ]Z//S,fS
∧ [−c]Z//S,fS
∧ [a¯]Z//S′,fS
∧ [a]W//S,fS
∧W//S′,fS
W//S′,fS
=ν [τ ]W//S′,fS
∧ [−c]W//S′,fS
∧ [b¯]T ∧ [c]F
Z//S′,fS
=ν [τ ]Z//S′,fS
∧ [−c]Z//S′,fS
∧ [b¯]T ∧ [a]W//S′,fS
W//S,fS
=ν [τ ]W//S,fS
∧ [−c]W//S,fS
∧ [a¯]W//S′,fS
∧ [c]F
We can note the process Y = a.−c.0 is a model of D//fS
. Then, for any component
X, we have S‖(Y S X) satisﬁes φ. For instance, consider X = a.c.0. Looking at
the ﬁrst rule of S , we have:
(S‖(Y S X)) = (a.b.0‖(a. − c.0 S a.c.0))
a
−→ (a.b.0‖(−c.0 S c.0))
Using the second rule we eventually get:
(a.b.0‖(−c.0 S c.0))
τ
−→ (a.b.0‖0 S 0)
and so the system still preserves its security since the actions performed by the
component X have been prevented from being visible outside.
7 Conclusion and Future work
We illustrated some results towards a uniform theory for enforcing security proper-
ties. With this work, we extended a framework based on process calculi and logical
techniques, that have been shown to be very suitable to model and verify several
security properties, to tackle also synthesis problems of secure systems.
As future work we plan to implement the theory here showed in order to gen-
erate the program controllers and to extend it in other application scenarios as the
time-based ones.
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